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Public Opinion Research Data on the Entry of the Czech  
Republic into NATO* 
 
PETR MAREŠ** 
Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Brno 
Abstract: This article was written in 1998, that is, before the Czech Republic was 
formally accepted as a member of NATO in March 1999. It is a classic secondary 
analysis of published results from public opinion polls, examining attitudes toward 
NATO among the Czech population. Support for and opposition to NATO entry 
closely corresponds to the political orientation of respondents, dividing right from 
left. This distinguishes the Czech Republic from Poland, where support for the coun-
try’s application for NATO membership also issues from a substantial part of left-
oriented voters. Those against Czech membership are not only individuals with a 
leftist orientation, but also nationalists. This analysis of public opinion research data 
attempts to identify how responses to questions about the consequences of NATO 
entry can sort people (whose attitude towards NATO is not known to us) into groups 
of supporters and opponents of the Czech Republic joining NATO. 
Czech Sociological Review, 2000, Vol. 8 (No. 1: 103-116) 
The Goal and Method 
The story of NATO expansion can, according to Steven Kull [1997], be seen from two 
angles. The first of these develops around the theme of the triumph of the West over 
communism and understands the expansion of NATO in the context (and discourse) of 
the Cold War as its completion and the securing of victory in its defence of freedom and 
democracy. However, it can also be seen as a precaution against any possible threat aris-
ing out of a revival of Russian authoritarian culture, which is now debilitated. This sec-
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ond view understands the expansion of the NATO as the creation of a new system of 
collective security with as many co-operating European countries involved as is possible. 
In this scenario, neither the Cold War nor Russia are the core issues. These are mutual 
assistance, communication and trade, and both regional and global security, without the 
creation of new borders or excluding anybody. The question is, how are these two stories 
reflected in the public opinion of the member countries of NATO, and in the public opin-
ion of countries that aspire to become members? What are the motivations in support of 
the extension of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and what leads people to oppose 
such a step? What is the proportion of factors supporting or rejecting entry into NATO 
among candidate countries? What discourse is used by the general population in the dis-
cussion on NATO? 
An attempt to answer such questions is the goal of this paper, which is a classic 
secondary analysis of published results from public opinion research, and in some cases 
an analysis of primary data collected by agencies conducting research on public opinion 
(namely STEM – the Centre for Empirical Research, IVVM – Institute for Public Opinion 
Polls and Sofres-Factum in the Czech Republic, and Focus agency in Slovakia). Our goal 
was: 
– to extract the most substantial information from a mosaic of hundreds of published par-
tial reports; 
– to reconstruct the chronology and continuity of information (research on the topic of 
NATO entry has been conducted in most of the post-communist countries since the be-
ginning of the 1990s, and at least some of the questions asked appear in various omni-
bus research with a certain periodicity); 
– to use hitherto unutilised information available from primary data, using sophisticated 
analysis. 
Context – Public Opinion in the Member Countries 
Among the population of the US, support for NATO expansion seems relatively high. 
However, the admittance of new countries into NATO does not seem as urgent a need to 
the public of the United States as to the people of the countries discussed. The transfor-
mation of NATO is not understood here as an opportunity to take an advantage of the 
weakness of Russia and to strengthen themselves against its threat, nor even as an expres-
sion of American financial interests. The American public want NATO to continue to 
exist, but there is a growing conviction about the need to transform NATO to reflect its 
new environment ready to face new tasks. There is a growing stress put on changing this 
original defence alliance into a guarantee of a system of international security. And this 
should be done not only in a wider regional perspective, but also in regulating relations 
and potential conflicts among its member states. NATO is required to become an institu-
tion supporting democracy, facing up to aggression or terrorism, and solving potential 
ethnic and other conflicts wherever they may occur.1 
Among the American public, the opinion is that the more countries participate in 
NATO co-operation, the better chance there is for sustaining peace. Nevertheless, other – 
moral – commitments towards acceptance of the Eastern European countries are also 
taken into consideration. Conversely, there are some pragmatic reasons at work against 
                                                     
1) These expectations extend beyond the NATO Charter. 
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their acceptance; mainly worries about the growing burden on the USA. The call from the 
American public for a reassessment of the function and purpose of NATO has a dual ef-
fect. On the one hand, it is for NATO expansion (in the expectation of enlarging the 
sphere of the ‘safe world’ by including other countries into it), on the other hand, it is 
against its expansion (leading to a willingness to transform NATO into something that 
goes beyond the borders of a classic defence pact – for example, by even being ready to 
accept Russia). The American public do not differentiate much among the individual 
applicant countries, not having favourites for the first wave of extension. 
The public of the Western European NATO member countries differentiates to a 
larger extent than the American public among applicant countries. The one exception to 
this is the Italian public, whose attitude resembles that of the Americans. However, even 
with this exception it seems clear that NATO expansion is perceived by its European 
members more in its geopolitical dimensions as a move of its borders further to the east 
of Europe. This is very clear in the case of Germany. The public opinion polls of member 
countries do not seriously consider the acceptance of Russia and Ukraine, nor even Ru-
mania and Bulgaria, and a bit surprisingly, not even Slovenia and the Baltic countries. 
This indicates that the public of European member countries are concerned about expand-
ing NATO into regions where their interests may clash with others (mostly Russian), or 
into regions that neighbour unstable regions. 
Such considerations are also affected by traditional relationships between applicant 
and member countries. There is a trinity of most acceptable new entrants, where the 
Czech Republic stands highest in the public opinion polls of Great Britain (although Po-
land occupies first place) and Germany. Nevertheless, Germany is generally sceptical as 
far as NATO expansion is concerned, as all the applicant countries have failed to gain 
acceptance. As far as traditional international connections are concerned there is a sur-
prising prevalence of disapproval with the entry of the Czech Republic among the French 
public. This disagreement could be explained by a generally cautious attitude of the 
French public towards NATO expansion. We should take into an account here though 
that Hungary and especially Poland stand substantially higher in the public opinion of 
France. 
Post-Communist Countries 
At first glance, it is clear that ambitions to enter NATO (and also the European Commu-
nity) are especially strong among the Polish public, which has traditionally had a tense 
relationship with Russia. Such ambitions are nevertheless high elsewhere, in countries 
where people see NATO as wonder-solution to all their problems. Their efforts to join 
NATO are not so much to provide security for the country as to lift it up from its post-
communist misery and to provide permanent and primarily quick welfare (e.g. Romania 
and Albania). This aim, without regard to its actual chances of being fulfilled, has become 
prevalent throughout the whole society of these countries, from right to left, from the high 
to low educated, from urban to remote rural inhabitants. 
In contrast to these countries the populations of Hungary and the Czech Republic, 
and even Slovakia, judge NATO expansion with more sobriety. Public opinion in these 
countries is polarised. They consider not only the positive effects of the prospective entry 
into NATO, but also its costs. The attitude of the public in these countries towards NATO 
admittance has not been so unconditionally positive. Along with the section of the society 
that supports such a step there are numerous groups of its opponents. The basic axes that 
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differentiate attitudes towards NATO in these countries are political orientation (from left 
to right of the spectrum) and the rate of nationalism. Those against NATO membership 
are not only individuals with a leftist orientation (in the Czech Republic the communist 
rhetoric is mixed up with nationalistic overtones, as it is in Slovakia and Hungary, but not 
in Poland) but also nationalists (in Slovakia and Hungary, while in the Czech Republic 
pure nationalistic sentiment is reduced to a marginal populist Republican party). 
The public of the applicant countries want, in contrast to that of the American and 
Western-European member countries who expect some change in NATO goals (widely 
understood as collective safety), to enter the ‘old’ NATO. From it they expect guarantees 
against the expansionism of Russia (the discourse of the Cold War – Russia is evidently 
perceived more as an adversary than a partner worthy of co-operation). The public hopes 
not only to gain external security but also internal stability. NATO membership is under-
stood as a completion of the transformation of society, that is, as a guarantee of its irre-
versibility. Economic reasons also play a role here. For advocates in the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Hungary, NATO membership means the first step towards prosperity and an 
admission ticket to the European Community. Indeed, some people in these countries see 
its benefits more in economic rather than security terms. 
The Czech Republic 
Czech public support for its NATO application is not particularly high, reflecting the 
differentiation of the population around not only this question. In this respect, the country 
belongs among such post-communist countries as Hungary and Slovakia, rather than 
countries such as Romania and Poland, where support for NATO cuts across the entire 
social and political spectrum. Nevertheless, support from the Czech public to enter 
NATO has risen over the last two years and currently stands at around 50-55%. About 
25-30% of the population are against entry, with about 15-20% undecided. It is worthy of 
note that together with Slovakia and Slovenia, the Czech Republic has relatively the 
highest proportion of people who would vote No to NATO accession in the case of a 
referendum. 
Table 1. Long-term support for the Czech Republic’s application to enter NATO (in percent-
age points)2 
“Do you agree with the Czech Republic’s entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganisation?” 
 Month/Year 
 10/91 05/93 11/93 11/94 11/95 11/96 11/97 1/98 04/98 07/98 09/98 12/98 
yes 39 42 47 42 46 38 43 54 *50 51 55 51 
no 40 36 27 28 39 36 29 24 27 32 26 30 
don’t know 21 22 26 30 15 26 28 22 23 17 19 19 
Source: Research by the Institute for Public Opinion Polls (IVVM) of the Czech Statistical 
Office. 
 
                                                     
2) In March 1998, about 57% of respondents answered Yes to a similar question formulated in the 
research by Středisko… (STEM – Centre for Empirical Research) in Prague (No 38%, and 5% do 
not know). The question was formulated one way though: “Do you agree with the admittance of 
the Czech Republic into the NATO?” 
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Table 2. Support for the Czech Republic’s attempts to join NATO in 1998 (in percentage 
points) 
“Do you agree with the Czech Republic’s entry into the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation?” 
 Year 1998 (Months) 
 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 
strongly agree 26 23 25 22 25 20 25 25 19 26 21 16 
mostly agree 28 32 29 28 30 31 30 30 36 31 29 35 
mostly disagree 14 15 14 15 17 19 19 19 16 15 17 17 
strongly disagree 10 11 10 12 12 13 13 13 10 11 13 13 
don’t know 22 19 22 23 16 17 17 13 19 17 20 19 
Source: Research by the Institute for Public Opinion Polls (IVVM) of the Czech Statistical 
Office. 
 
What is specific for the Czech public is their polarisation into internally consistent atti-
tudes for and against NATO entry. This is more a tension between positive and undecided 
attitudes in most of the applicant countries. Yet here we can also expect a high latent re-
sistance to NATO integration among the undecided. In the Czech Republic, the line di-
viding support and resistance to NATO entry among the population runs straight between 
the left and right.3 This distinguishes the Czech Republic from Poland, where support 
also comes from a substantial part of left-oriented voters. This brings the Czech Republic 
closer to Hungary and Slovakia, with the difference that in these countries the resistance 
towards NATO entry is not concentrated among left-wing voters, but also among numer-
ous nationalists. In contrast to Hungary and to Slovakia in particular, the Czech Republic 
does not have a substantial nationalist-oriented resistance towards NATO. Nevertheless, 
part of the nationalist-oriented resistance towards NATO was adopted by the discourse of 
the Czech left. At first sight, the nationalistically motivated negative attitude of the voters 
of the populist Republican Party is more a result of xenophobia and fear of Germany. 
These Republican voters would not object at all to NATO nor to the entry of the Czech 
Republic into NATO, if they did not see NATO as a sophisticated German tool to ma-
nipulate the country. 
Table 3. How voters of political parties would vote in a hypothetical referen-
dum on NATO entry (in percentage points) 
 vote for NATO entry 
Favoured political party yes no 
KSČM – Communist Party (Extreme Left) 14 86 
ČSSD – Czech Social Democratic Party (Left) 57 43 
KDU-ČSL – Christian Democratic Party (Centrist) 67 33 
US – Union of Freedom (Right) 94 6 
ODS – Civic Democratic Party (Right) 92 8 
SPR-RSČ – Republican Party (National Extreme Right) 21 79 
Source: STEM – September 1998 poll. 
 
                                                     
3) People can be correctly classified as supporters/opponents of admission to NATO on the basis 
of their political orientation (71 per cent) – result of Discriminant Analysis. 
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Despite a significant split in the Czech Republic on the subject of NATO entry, there is a 
strong probability that the result of a hypothetical referendum would approve it, although 
the upper limit of support would be approximately 67% of adult inhabitants. A further 
growth of approval above this limit would need to come from changes in strongly op-
posed attitudes. This is very unlikely because these attitudes are very consistent. But even 
this higher threshold of support, that is, in a referendum, would depend on the level of 
willingness to participate in it. 
The population of the Czech Republic feels relatively safe in the Central European 
region when compared with the Polish public, for example, and less abandoned than the 
public of Slovakia. Both in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic the data from public opin-
ion polls reflect a novelty of the public thinking in a wider geopolitical context, and their 
heritage of geopolitical recklessness. The Central European region is perceived as safe. 
The majority of the population in the Czech Republic is convinced that there is no poten-
tial military threat to the country. This view is most prevalent among the young. Long-
term monitoring of public opinion shows how sensitively the public perceives conflicts in 
their close neighbourhood, but also how quickly their worries die away once the conflicts 
are suppressed. This is true regardless of whether conflicts have really ended or are just in 
a temporary lull. Balkan countries were still considered a military threat in the middle of 
1995 (15% of respondents thought so) but in 1998 this fear has abated (now 4%). And 
this is precisely at the time when a new conflict is about to break out. The majority of the 
population do not have major fears over possible effects resulting from the international 
situation on our security. 
There is a widespread feeling in the Czech Republic that sources of military danger 
emanating from more remote areas (such as, for example, Islamic countries) cannot be 
underestimated. This is in contrast to Poland, but partly also to Hungary, where the public 
perceives a threat more from its immediate environs. The main source of threat though, 
according to public opinion research, is Russia (fixed at about almost a half of the adult 
population) and Germany (fixed at about one-fifth of the public). In reverse logic, the 
highest rate of trust (a feeling that there is nothing to worry about from that quarter) ap-
plies to the USA, but again also to Germany. Concern about Russia or Germany is not 
dispersed randomly, it is concentrated in certain segments of the population. Right-wing 
oriented people are afraid of Russia, and their concern about Germany is negligible, the 
situation among left-wing oriented people is reversed. Concern about Germany draws 
from resentment to their character and increases with age; the generation in their 60’s is 
twice as fearful as those in their 30’s. Nevertheless, the biggest concern among young 
people is about Russia. However, the sense of an external military threat coming from the 
side of Russia is, among the Czech public, as it turns out smaller than one might have 
expected. This seems to be due to several factors: 
– The left-oriented part of the population rejects the thought of threat coming from Russia 
principally; 
– The extreme right-wing, Republican-voting part of the population rejects it because 
they emphasise the threat coming from Germany; 
– Another part of the population is not worried about the threat from Russia because they 
are convinced of its weakness. 
What is specific about this is the fact that the bigger potential threat from outside is per-
ceived more by the left-oriented part of the public. Their anxiety is not alleviated by join-
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ing NATO. Indeed, it is the existence of NATO that remains an important source of this 
anxiety, a view which in today’s world can be regarded as an anachronism. The fears of 
these people are describable and are being described in the same language as could com-
monly have been heard before 1990. It is the discourse of the communist idea of the bipo-
larity of the world that has retained its terms of expression (warmonger, revanchism, 
capital interests) up until today. Even the sources of this anxiety are the same as in the 
past: the United States, France, Great Britain, and Germany, of course, as imperialist 
aggressors. 
Neither concerns about the international political situation nor those about a direct 
attack on the country in a military conflict are the factors for the Czech public that would 
accelerate in the search for security under NATO umbrella. Attitudes towards NATO 
seem much more to be a question of the political orientation of people than their concerns 
about security risks. It is the political orientation of people that influences their concerns 
about a threat to the country and their attitude towards NATO (fears of a threat to the 
country thus is only an intervening variable). NATO membership is more of a guarantee 
for society of its irreversible turn away from the past. It is considered more a release from 
the potential risk of internal regression of the social system than a protection against ex-
ternal danger. 
Motivation for gaining membership thus circle around questions of security insur-
ance against external threats (especially from Russia), but also around the prospects of 
internal political stability of the country. It also stems from the idea that joining NATO 
could be a boost to its economic development. In this respect, Czechs do not differ so 
much from the populations of other aspirant countries, although their faith is much 
weaker than that of some (e.g. Romania, Albania) who see NATO (and the USA even 
more so) as a strong patron who will cure all their ills. 
The attitude of the Czech Republic towards NATO is ambivalent in yet another re-
spect. Correspondent analysis or results from various research into public opinion show 
how the public paradoxically inclines to inconsistent attitudes. The belief that the country 
should defend its sovereignty at any cost co-exists with the belief that any such attempt 
would nevertheless be futile in its chances of success. That is to say that in the end, the 
fate of such a small country as this is always decided by great powers. While half of re-
spondents asked in a row of research studies believed that if we did not enter NATO the 
Czech Republic would be at the mercy of Russia, a similar though slightly smaller pro-
portion think that NATO membership would help Germany to take over the country. 
There is always around half of the population with the opinion that the destiny of the 
country is either in the hands of one or the other great (regional) power. Inside NATO we 
are a toy in the hands of Germany, and outside and it would be Russia who would play 
with us. The belief in the influence of Germany and Russia on our destiny is strong, 
though only about 16 per cent express the opinion that the country is caught in a fatal trap 
between the great powers (without any chance of escape). 
The analysis of research results from public opinion research agencies (e.g. STEM 
and Sofres-Factum) gives us a summary of the public’s expectations towards NATO en-
try: 
– A growing feeling of safety (namely from Russia). Part of the population – and it can be 
guessed that these are the opponents of joining NATO – is nonetheless convinced about 
the growth of the risk of military threat after admission to NATO. 
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– A certain financial burden, or higher defence costs, than in the case of development of 
an independent defence, and as a result of this – higher taxes. 
– Certain safety costs (nuclear weapons on Czech territory). 
– Economic impulses arising from the increased attractiveness of the country for foreign 
investors, a growth of confidence in the Czech Republic for the developed countries of 
the world, and access to advanced technologies. 
– Reduced sovereignty, subordination to other countries, dependence on them, but also 
NATO military bases stationed on Czech territory. 
Using a discriminative analysis of analogous public opinion research data, an attempt was 
made to identify some of the consequences of acceptance into NATO. Such consequences 
that, as stressed and emphasised by respondents, signal whether these people are advo-
cates or opponents of NATO entry. The goal of the analysis was to identify opinions that 
can sort people, whose attitude towards NATO is not known to us, into groups of sup-
porters and opponents of NATO membership for the Czech Republic. In all the cases 
used, the discriminative ability of the selected indicators was very high (they helped us 
classify about 90 per cent of people – see Table 6).4 
Table 4. Discriminant Analysis (Data from STEM Polls) 
Eigenvalues and Wilks’ Lambda 
  Canonical Wilks’ 
 Eigenvalue Correlation Lambda Chi-square df Significance 
September 1998 survey 4.467* 0.904 0.183 2602.539 8 0.000 
May 1998 survey 1.226* 0.742 0.449 1239.248 11 0.000 
April 1998 survey 2.505* 0.845 0.285 1333.193 8 0.000 
*) First 1 canonical discriminant functions were used in the analysis. 
 
 
                                                     
4) Tables no. 4-6 contain findings of three different polls. 
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Table 5. Discriminant Analysis (Data from STEM Polls) 
Coefficients 
 CFC 
 (vote for NATO) 
Variables used in Analysis SCDFC SM CDFC yes no  
Survey 1998, September 
Joining NATO –  
 the best way to ensure national security 0.700 0.857 2.966 26.561 39.575 
Enlargement of NATO  
 definitely will remove the iron curtain 0.226 0.457 0.657 12.088 14.970 
Military presence of USA in Europe is necessary 0.094 0.414 0.251 12.828 13.928 
There are better ways to ensure national security -0.212 -0.427 -0.604 12.147 9.524 
Enlargement of NATO is unnecessary -0.147 -0.431 -0.423 13.019 11.161 
We will be inferior to other countries  
 in NATO -0.130 -0.496 -0.379 13.971 12.309 
Germany will gain control over our country  
 in NATO -0.079 -0.334 -0.202 6.145 5.258 
NATO enlargement will split Europe again -0.037 -0.369 -0.096 9.258 8.836 
 
Survey 1998, May 
Improving our prestige 0.391 0.733 0.591 2.502 3.849 
Accelerating economic growth 0.179 0.576 0.250 3.854 4.424 
Improving credibility of the country  
 for foreign investors 0.170 0.614 0.250 1.116 1.735 
Political stability in the country 0.153 0.575 0.213 3.182 3.668 
Improving the chances of joining EU 0.034 0.428 0.050 0.430 0.545 
Presence of Czech soldiers in military conflicts -0.004 0.166 -0.007 2.208 2.192 
Foreign army in the Czech Republic -0.052 -0.385 -0.064 1.375 1.229 
Atomic weapons in the Czech Republic -0.153 -0.508 -0.182 1.810 1.395 
Unnecessary expenditure on defence -0.248 -0.614 -0.332 3.450 2.692 
Freedom of our country will be limited -0.268 -0.544 -0.328 2.275 1,528 
 
Survey 1998, April 
The country will be powerless outside NATO 0.549 0.712 1.660 10.188 15.443 
Joining NATO is necessary for the economy 0.217 0.403 0.523 4.832 6.486 
Consent to NATO troops in the Czech Republic 0.096 0.358 0.240 8.046 8.806 
Membership in NATO is more important  
 than the market 0.083 0.243 0.208 7.178 7.837 
Consent to atomic weapons  
 in the Czech Republic 0.042 0.267 0.109 7.854 8.197 
Russia threatens our country 0.030 0.207 0.064 3.465 3.667 
Neutrality is the best solution -0.296 -0.560 -0.789 15.104 12.605 
In joining NATO we will lose our sovereignty -0.461 -0.616 -1.289 15.049 10.968 
SCDFC = Standardised Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients; SM = Structure Matrix; 
CDFC = Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients. 
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Table 6. Discriminant Analysis (Data from STEM Polls) 
Classification Results 
 Predicted Group Membership 
Vote for NATO 1 yes 2 no Total Correctly Classified 
Survey 1998, September 
1 yes count 912 65 977 
 % 93.3 6.7 100.0 
2 no count 26 535 561 
 % 4.6 95.4 100.0 
3 ungrouped cases count 6 11 17 
 % 35.3 64.7 100.0 94.1 
 
Survey 1998, May 
1 yes count 846 118 964 
 % 87.8 12.2 100.0 
2 no count 73 519 592 
 % 12.3 87.7 100.0 
3 ungrouped cases count 7 16 23 
 % 30.4 69.6 100.0 87.4 
 
Survey 1998, April 
1 yes count 506 52 558 
 % 90.7 9.3 100.0 
2 no count 40 471 511 
 % 7.8 92.2 100.0 
3 ungrouped cases count 161 296 457 
 % 35.2 64.8 100.0 91.4 
 
Items where a positive selection predicts a positive attitude (a negative selection predicts 
a negative attitude) towards NATO are: the end of the division of Europe, the increased 
prestige of the country, the growth of the chances of being accepted into the European 
Union, interior political stability and a barrier to Russian expansion, the helplessness of 
the country without NATO membership, the necessity of membership for the economy of 
the country, advancement in trustworthiness for investors and speeding up the economic 
development of the country, external and internal security, confidence of an equal posi-
tion of the country within NATO, and the feeling of the need for American presence in 
Europe. Items where a positive answer predicts a negative attitude towards NATO (nega-
tive selection predicts a positive attitude) are represented by the following consequences 
of NATO expansion or admission into NATO: being under the control of Germany, the 
division of Europe, excessive costs (and a feeling connected with this of the possibility to 
ensure the safety of the country by other means than by NATO entry), sovereignty loss, 
limitations to the freedom of the country, surrender to the interests of the great powers. 
In the Czech Republic, opponents to NATO entry stress similar disadvantages and 
risks of such a step as those in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. These are the alleged loss 
of sovereignty, and being taken over by Germany, but also the unacceptability of some 
assumed duties of member countries (a NATO military presence or nuclear weapons sta-
tioned on the territory of the Czech Republic) and risks arising out of membership. Above 
all, it is the assumption of a disproportionate economic load connected with joining 
NATO and membership. Risks, dependency, costs – this is a triad in which most of their 
argumentation oscillates. 
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Here a typology can be identified of usual argumentation among people on the sub-
ject of NATO, according to whether they declare themselves as right-wing, left-wing, or 
in the centre: 
– Left: NATO membership will reduce our sovereignty, and will lead to German control 
over the country. Again we will have foreign troops on our territory, and we will be 
subject to malice from Russia. 
– Right: NATO membership will guarantee not only the security of the country against an 
external attack, but also its internal political stability, it will have economic benefits, 
and it will advance the attractiveness of the country leading to an inflow of foreign in-
vestment. 
– Centre: NATO admission will lead to a growth in defence costs and to higher taxes. We 
will be forced to accept nuclear weapons on our territory, and the risk of the country 
getting involved in military conflicts will increase. 
What do people think can replace NATO? If we offer the opponents of joining NATO the 
opportunity to consider other national security solutions than NATO membership, they 
cite most of all neutrality (37%), also reliance on the Czech army (16%), and on the 
Czech people in general. The situation is similar both in Hungary and Slovakia (not so 
much in Poland, or especially in Romania, where confidence in the great power cover of 
the USA has almost the character of resignation into reliable hands). Some less binding 
forms of guarantee are also present from the side of the great powers or pan-European 
defence. Neutrality is the least expensive form of securing the defence of the country in 
the eyes of the public. And this is so regardless of whether the public prefers NATO 
membership or not. It is the neutrality defenders who see the costs connected with joining 
NATO as unnecessarily high. The proportion of people who believe that NATO entry is 
the most costly way of securing the safety of the country is twice as high among the pro-
ponents of neutrality as among the advocates of NATO membership. Neutrality is, to-
gether with regional military co-operation, the solution to the security situation especially 
for the voters of left-wing parties. Namely for the voters of the Communist party, but also 
the voters of the Social Democrats are no less represented. This solution is also seductive 
to voters of the centre parties and to the populist Republicans. 
The public (the media to be more precise5) discourse on the debate about NATO is 
played against the background of a search for a new national and state identity. However, 
it is strongly loaded with resentments and judgement of the past. It is not just one dis-
course that is represented here, but two competing discourses: to simplify it – left- and 
right-wing (in the sense of the classic concept of the left-right spectrum of political orien-
tation). Nationalist discourse is also strongly present in the leftist discourse, but in con-
trast to other applicant countries (especially in contrast to Slovakia) it has little influence 
in itself. Its not numerous, autonomous bearers are concentrated around the Republican 
Party. 
From research studies of public opinion we know the characteristics of bearers of 
this left-wing and nationalist discourse. They are mostly people who are socially margin-
alised, low educated, with a narrow scope of life view, and anomic. Right and left dis-
course develops independently and they compete only in a limited sense. Each of these 
                                                     
5) See Mareš (1999) or Alner (1998a, b), Vašečka (1998). 
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two discourses has its own phraseology (metaphors, latent symbols) which reflects hopes 
and concerns, and oscillates between ideals and pragmatic attitudes. Thematically, both of 
the discourses concentrate around analogous themes: 
– safety and risks. 
– place in Europe, identity and sovereignty. 
– cost (not only financial) and willingness to pay for it and benefit. 
– values – orientation towards NATO entry is often more of an expression of wider con-
siderations and thoughts on the place of the country within Europe and the world than a 
result of a feeling of threat. 
Conclusion 
The polarised public opinion means that the discussion on NATO membership takes 
place in two languages. The lesser represented left discourse concentrates around the lack 
of necessity of joining NATO when there are other (cheaper and safer) ways to secure the 
safety of the country. In contrast to Slovakia not even the left discourse points to co-
operation with Russia as one of these ways. Not even the image of the country as a bridge 
between NATO and Russia is represented here, as is widespread in Slovakia. Russia is 
not presented as an ally (neither military nor even economic) in this discourse. It is only 
argued that NATO expansion endangers the natural interests of Russia. It refers to desta-
bilisation of Europe and renewal of its division caused by the acceptance of the post-
communist countries into NATO. What is interesting is the fact that it is the left discourse 
that is soaked in worries and a feeling of military threat to the country (much more than 
the right-wing discourse). Pointing to the threat to Russia caused by NATO expansion 
indirectly enlarges this concern and spreads it even outside its discourse. NATO is evi-
dently understood as a guarantee of the interests of capitalism. The core of objections is a 
loss of the sovereignty of the country after NATO admission, and a phobia of German 
control. In the background there can be felt some aversion to the values represented by 
NATO. 
A sophisticated form of this discourse employs the possible costs of NATO admis-
sion. It is not only the Czech public but also the populations of other applicant countries 
and of individual member countries that are sensitive to reminders of financial sacrifice, 
the American public included. It is being indicated that nobody has ever worked out how 
much it costs to enter NATO and whether it would bring a decline in the standard of liv-
ing. Membership is not rejected directly, it even has some manifest support (for example, 
among Social Democratic voters) but it is indicated that the government must respect 
public opinion in this case (as seen in the accent placed on organising a referendum, for 
example). This discourse is shared by both the left and the political centre (on the level of 
the media as well as on the level of opinions of people who are members of the centre). 
Right-wing discourse stresses the importance of NATO values as well as the values 
of Europe that we want to return to. It stems not only from an identification with the val-
ues but also the interests of the Czech Republic and NATO. NATO admission is pre-
sented as a guarantee of not only external safety, but also internal stability. It is not then a 
threat but a guarantee of sovereignty. In the background there is a belief that only after 
NATO entry will the irreversibility of changes since 1989 be guaranteed. Great impor-
tance is given to expectations of an economic contribution – entry into NATO is a gate-
way to the European Union and thus also to prosperity. As with the left-wing discourse, 
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where there was a clear purposeful call for a referendum, it is with clear purpose ex-
plained here that such a poll is not necessary. The reversal of the traditional trend is inter-
esting; the right have taken over the paternalistic left-wing vision regarding the political 
inexperience and irresponsibility of the people, and the left have adopted the right-wing 
thesis of the sovereignty of the will of citizens. Unpleasant duties arising from NATO 
membership are admitted even in the right discourse. But neither acceptance of the possi-
bility of the stationing of foreign troops or nuclear weapons on Czech soil are arguments 
against the NATO admission. 
Secondary analysis of data from public opinion research studies indicates that there 
exists a hard core of the convinced – either of the necessity of entering NATO, or of the 
necessity of preventing such a step. Any attempt to win over people from either category, 
to the other one is a waste of energy. However, there is a large group of people, whose 
attitude towards the Czech Republic joining NATO is ambivalent, undecided, or who are 
indifferent to the issue, as they even may have not noticed it, or taken it into considera-
tion. This potential is not negligible. Let us remind ourselves that the number of unde-
cided oscillates between 20 and 30%, and in research studies conducted regularly by 
Eurobarometer in the Czech Republic this figure has gone as high as 50% (of those who 
do not know whether they would support or oppose the Czech Republic joining NATO in 
a referendum). There is a fertile field among them for missions from both the left and 
right. The answers of undecided persons to the discriminatory items show that about 40% 
of the people are strongly influencable. These people could indeed tip the scales either 
way. In one representative research study of public opinion, the data analysis has shown 
that among them about 26% are latent opponents to NATO entry, 33% are supporters of 
joining NATO, and the remaining roughly 40% cannot decided. 
In summary, we can claim that even though the Czech public is not one-
dimensionally oriented towards NATO, as is the case of the Polish public, membership is 
still understood as the best strategy of achieving national security by a substantial part of 
the public. The Czech public would nevertheless be prepared to accept other forms of 
security arrangements. For example, some kind of one-sided guarantee from the side of 
NATO (without the actual membership of the Czech Republic in NATO), co-operation 
with smaller countries of the Central European region, or neutrality. The Czech left does 
not want co-operation with Russia, as is the case for the Slovak left, but rather tends to-
wards independent defence or neutrality. 
The question of joining NATO is connected with the question of becoming a mem-
ber of the European Union. There are three numerous distinctive types (clearly formed 
and existing alongside less numerous groups of those who would give their support only 
to one of them) in the public: 
– people who are at the same time for the admission of the country into both of the insti-
tutions representing European structures (EU and NATO) – about 40%; 
– people who are at the same time against the admission of the country to any of the insti-
tutions representing European structures (EU and NATO) – about 16%; 
–  people who do not know how to decide in any of these cases – about 25%. 
Those who are decided on supporting entry into one of the mentioned institutions and do 
not support the other (or do not know how to decide in this case) are a very marginal 
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group. Borders between the first and the second of the above mentioned distinctive types 
is again delineated by political orientation. 
Epilogue – one year after entry 
Table 7. Support for Czech membership of NATO – February 2000 (percent-
age points) 
“Do you agree or disagree with the membership of your country in 
NATO?” 
 Czech Republic Hungary Poland 
 (IVVM) (TÁRKI) (CBOS) 
agree 49 61 63 
neither agree nor disagree 19 23 18 
disagree 26 10 12 
don’t know 6 6 7 
Source: Prague, IVVM February 28, 2000 (IVVM – Institute for Public Opin-
ion Polls at the Czech Statistical Office; TÁRKI – Centre for Social 
Research; CBOS – Centre for Public Opinion Research). 
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